The tone of these debates was not always very friendly. No matter. This is an important subject, and Avalos is an intelligent man, with a great deal of learning. In reading and reviewing Fighting Words: The Origins of Religious Violence, I will try to be fair, though I certainly come to the book with partial (but not complete) skepticism.
The theoretical apparatus and deliberation with which Avalos begins this book is impressive. As in his other writings, Avalos makes it clear that he thinks fellow scholars have missed the big picture simply by not reading widely enough, and that he is prepared to take up the slack. He has read widely, in many languages. Avalos makes the extent of his ambition clear in the introduction: both religious theories of violence, and academic theories, have failed, and Avalos proposes to supplant them with a new and better theory of how "religion" cruelly harms the world by vastly inflating the amount of unnecessary violence that occurs in it.
I am skeptical, not so much about ANY cheerful or gloomy assessments, but about the whole enterprise -- whether it even makes sense to reify what Avalos calls "religion" in the first place. I think Avalos' task is like trying to hold a downspout full of water in your hands -- in the end, your hands will be wet enough to say water flowed through them, but most of the water will have seaped into the ground and disappeared, long since.
And so, I predict, the facts will largely, but not entirely, elude Avalos' analysis.
In this post, I focus on the book's introduction. Here, Dr. Avalos he announces his intent to show that religion causes violence because it "creates new scarce resources." This is true not just of one religion, and not just of "fundamentalism," but of religion in general, liberalism as well as jihadist Islam, the New Testament maybe even more than the Old.
Several preliminary questions arose for me while reading the first few pages.
*What does Avalos mean by "religion?"
*What does he mean by "violence?"
* Can he show empirically that what he calls "religion" actually results in more violence than would occur without it? In other words, is there some control population to compare with the "religious," so that we even know there is a phenomena in need of explanation?
* Will Dr. Avalos even attempt to do this? Or will he, instead, merely offer a series of post-hoc attempts to relate actual instances of violence, to their supposed religious roots?
* Will Avalos discuss the many cases in which religions caused violence to stop, or justice to win over injustice? Or will we only look at one half of the equation, in this book?
* How will he account for the violence of atheistic societies? Will he attempt to "explain away" communist violence, and then represent, say, Sweden, as the normal non-religious society?
* Does he assume that "violence" is the only or main ill to avoid? Or will he try to balance "violence" against other ills, or goods to be won? (For instance, many aboriginal tribes seem to endure a high level of violence, but also seem more outgoing and sociable than more staid, hands-off neighboring groups.)
* Could there be a relationship between the breakdown of a society's "sacred canopy," and the decay of a civilization? Maybe societies need a certain level of violence to survive? Or will Avalos take the Swedish point of view for granted?
Fortunately, Dr. Avalos recognizes the need to define key terms, and answers the first question just a few pages into his introduction. He defines religion as follows:
"A mode of life and thought that presupposes the existence of, and relationship with, unverifiable forces and / or beings."
Avalos quickly makes it clear that this definition will be crucial to the argument that follows. Here, if I am not mistaken, I see the foundations of that argument already shaking:
(a) Definitions of religion tend to fall into two categories: (a) those that make belief in supernatural beings essential, as this one does, and (b) psychological or sociological definitions, like Paul Tillich's "ultimate concern." (When people talk about communism as a religion, they usually assume such a broad definition.)
As a secular humanist, of course Avalos wants to define religion in such a way that he can slam "religion" without his own position taking collateral damage. This is why he has to define religion in relation to supernatural beings.
But socially, many secular ideologies seem to act like religions. We'll see if he can explain, say, communism away, without engaging in special pleading. ("But communism is really a secular religion, because Joseph Stalin went to a seminary!")
(b) Avalos supposes that belief in the supernatural involves a special "mode of life and thought." Yet surely on evolutionary grounds, human beings all partake in a mode of life and thought that is far more similar than different. If atheists really are so different from the rest of humanity, such
radical bipolarity would seem an odd result for evolution to accomplish. This appears psychologically naive.
(c) The word "presuppose" assumes that religious people believe a priori, rather than in response to evidence.
Yet this is obviously untrue for many believers. Paul believed because he met Jesus on the road to Damascus -- he didn't "presuppose" the deity of Christ. A legal scholar I know in England converted to Christianity from Islam after he heard the audible voice of God. I maintain belief in Christianity over more than 30 years of researching and weighing the evidence.
(d) But the biggest "leap" Avalos takes in his definition, is to say that religion involves faith in "unverifiable" beings or forces. What is "unverifiable" supposed to mean? Avalos does not explain, yet this word presupposes immensely difficult issues of epistemology.
Didn't the sight and sound of Jesus speaking to him, and then his blindness as a result, verify the spiritual reality of Jesus to St. Paul?
Doesn't the word "sign" in the Bible point to the fact that the whole point of the gospels is to verify Christian theology, to show how Jesus verified his Messiah-hood, to show that God has verified his call to Israel and the world by raising Jesus from the dead?
As I have argued (see my anthology "Faith and Reason" at christthetao.com), historically, Christian thinkers have almost always argued that Christian theism is in fact verifiable -- that the facts support Christian truth.
Avalos seems here to simply defy or ignore almost all of Christian history and thought about the matter, and for that matter the rational arguments that followers of Mohammed and other teachers make.
And this looks like a key assumption for Avalos. He makes it clear already, that much of what he says in the rest of the book will depend on this definition of religion, in particular on the allegedly unverifiable character of religious claims.
Of course, Avalos probably believes, or claims to believe, that religious claims cannot be supported by good evidence. But you can't just assume something like that, basing a 300 page book on premises that most people deny, without even acknowledging the difficulty!
If Avalos chooses a stringent criteria for verification, one might argue that precious little in this world is "verifiable." Most of what we believe is based on much less than logical or mathematical certainty. And even math and logic depend on our minds, which skeptics often inform us are terribly prone to error.
Maybe Avalos will try to prove that religion can never be verifiable, later in the book -- though it is hard to see how one could fit an adequate refutation of, say, Pascal, William Lane Craig or Gary Habermas, into a single chapter or book. And he doesn't seem to have dedicated any chapters to defending this immense assumption. So while the house looks like it might rise several stories tall, with elegant pillars and fine wooden carvings and tasteful bonsai trees out front, the foundations appear to be resting on sand.
No doubt these issues will come up later in the book, and we will have to return to them. A few other points worth note from the introduction:
* "We define violence as the act of modifying and / or inflicting pain upon the human body in order to express or impose power differentials."
This also seems an odd definition, though maybe not as potentially devastating as Dr. Avalos' defintion of religion.
If a man shoots an intruder to protect his property, that is not "violence," because his goal is self-protection, and he is not thinking about power? (The imposition of power differentials being a means, not an end?) Or a rapist, if he sincerely wants sexual pleasure? Or even if the Greeks conquered Troy to get back a woman, that was not violence if their motives were pure?
I don't think it's a good idea to allow psychology to play such a large role in defining a physical act.
* Avalos discusses historical causation relatively well.
* "If any scholars come to believe, on the basis of their academic research, that religion or specific religious traditions are harmful to humanity, then it follows that it is their obligation to counteract those beliefs. Of course, this means a nonviolent and dialogic approach, given the current pluralistic politics." (26)
I want to agree, but I'm a little puzzled, here. Why must we assume one must only counteract harmful traditions non-violently? Does this mean a scholar must not serve in Afghanistan, say by violently opposing armies that seek to institutionalize abuse of women?
Why? "Given the current pluralistic politics?" And if conditions change, secular humanists should use violence? Under what conditions or principles?
* "The best way to deal with religious violence is to undermine religion itself." (28)
Perhaps, assuming that (a) religion is a thing that can be "undermined" in general; (b) religious violence is greater than violence without religion; (c) religion does not prevent worse things than violence (despair? boredom? communist jihad?)
* "One has to confront violence in each religion in a frank manner. I believe I do it evenhandedly. As a secular humanism, I do not favor one religion over another, as I hold all of them to be equally based on unverifiable grounds." (29)
Here we learn why Avalos must define religion as he does. Being innocent of a religion in the sense in which he has defined it, he is in a privileged position to act as Judge, Jury, and Executioner of that of which he himself suffers no taint.
* He then admits, however, that "all worldviews" are "hegemonic," including pluralism -- a point John Hick would do well to note.
* "Religious violence is always ethically reprehensible, while the same cannot be said of non-religious violence."
This seems a little unfair. So if, based on reflection and prayer, and appealing to deep theological beliefs, Dietrich Bonhoeffer decides to join the conspiracy to kill Adolf Hitler, his fellow-conspirators may be innocent, because of their secular motives, but Bonhoeffer alone must stand guilty?
We are not far into the book, but already profound problems have appeared that seem to undermine Avalos' thesis. We will see what he builds on this foundation, and whether some of his later structures serve, among other things, to help buttress the shaky foundations below, and firm the loose sands on which everything looks to be built.
Continue on to Part II here.
22 comments:
In other words, is there some control population to compare with the "religious," so that we even know there is a phenomena in need of explanation?
It is not possible to do a control group study of an historical claim. The best you can do is a comparison group study. Similar, but not the same.
Will Avalos discuss the many cases in which religions caused violence to stop, or justice to win over injustice?
You can't present a control group study of this claim, for the same reason.
Definitions of religion tend to fall into two categories: (a) those that make belief in supernatural beings essential, as this one does,
No it doesn't. It says "unverifiable forces and/or beings." As I read it, the key term is "unverifiable."
When people talk about communism as a religion, they usually assume such a broad definition.
Whoa, now there's an admission I never thought I'd see you put into print. I am impressed. Now if I can just get you to extend that courtesy of broad definition to politics. Ie., if an economic system like communism may legitimately be viewed as a "religion," then it is certainly legitimate to view a religion like Christianity as a political system.
The word "presuppose" assumes that religious people believe a priori, rather than in response to evidence.
Hardly surprising since there is no empirical evidence.
If Avalos chooses a stringent criteria for verification, one might argue that precious little in this world is "verifiable."
"verifiable" can certainly be used in a fuzzy way, but it's not clear from the little you quote that Avalos is necessarily doing this. My fall-back position is usually science: if one makes a claim about the real world, then that is a physical claim which can be physically tested. Verification in that case is quite explicitly defined, and in fact a great number of things are verifiable under this criterion.
"Verifiable" in the scientific sense does NOT, by the way, mean "certain" or "absolute" -- as has been pointed out many, many times, by many, many people with scientific backgrounds. Since the meaning of "proof" in math is specific, narrow, and only applies in a mathematical context., to invoke "mathematical certainty" in the context of a definition of religion is disingenuous. You are doing exactly what you accuse Avalos of doing: qualifying his definition in such a way that you can slam it without causing collateral damage to your own position.
All in all, though, perhaps you'd better read the whole book before deciding that his position is "shaking", rather than pre-judging it on the basis of the introduction alone.
I look forward to a more complete review.
Dr. H: Sorry, but beginning by defining both "religion" and "violence" in such dubious ways, does present a serious problem for the book as a whole.
Again, most religions, including Christianity, do not see God or the gods as "unverifiable." You may think they have in fact never been verified, but that by itself is an enormous assumption, which no one person can really make. How do you know no one has ever heard from God verbally, or seen the dead rise, for instance? And even if you think you know that (somehow -- though it is impossible), why should Avalos ASSUME that, without any argument? (And I've read two chapters, now, without finding a trace of one.)
Miracles are, precisely, verification of religious claims. There are many other forms of verification.
Sorry, but Avalos' definition is itself not only unjustied, but unjustifiable. It is obviously chosen precisely so as to put his own religion in the driver's seat in the ensuing discussion.
And of course I understand the difference between verification and proof. I spent painful months trying to hammer that very distinction into your head: I'm glad if it has finally lodged there, however fitfully. My point is that Avalos cannot reasonably conflate scientific verification with verification in general, either.
I don't know why you're surprised what I said about communism. I've made the same point to you many times -- that scholars of communism often describe it as a secular or atheistic religion.
As for the semantics of control groups and comparison groups, fine; thanks for improving my language.
"Miracles are, precisely, verification of religious claims"
And how, praytell, does one go about "verifying" a miracle?
You believe that a mortal human could not be wrong about their "miracle" experience?
And certainly not a Christian experience!!
I would imagine that pretty much all religious people have their own personal miracle stories. So by your logic, all religions are true if the miracle stories are really, really, super-dooper!!!
And what did the apostle Paul "see", regarding Jesus? A bright light and a voice? Gee, that's really astonishing!!
Well, that's what the book of Acts states. Although Paul himself never mentions any Damascus road conversion experience. Nor does he ever describe what his "seeing" Jesus actually entailed.
Ahh, Christianity. What a sweet delusion you must be!
"And how, pray tell, does one go about 'verifying' a miracle?"
I said miracles ARE verification, not that they need to be verified. If God speaks to you, or you see a dead man raised, or you walk on water, the probative value of the event should be obvious -- though of course you may consider the possibility that you are insane, that someone has planted a microphone, that the "dead man" had only fainted, etc.
You make it sound like this is something mysterious.
As for delusions, that may describe your understanding of the New Testament. Paul does, in fact, tell his conversion story three times in Acts, and then twice speaks of how Jesus revealed himself, in I Corinthians and Galatians, in terms totally in harmony with the story given in Acts. He doesn't say it was on the road to Damascus, but he does mention meeting Jesus, whch was the point of the story. And then he says he "returned" (υπεσρεψσα) to Damascus afterwards. This word always means in the NT Greek just what it means in English -- he had been to the place, then went back. This assumes his audience already knows that his conversion led him to Damascus. Why do you suppose he assumed that? Obviously (from Acts), because telling his conversion story was part of Paul's ordinary oral witness. And this fits his letters, too, since he mentions it twice there, both times in excellent harmony with the Acts reports.
Of course Christians can be wrong about miracles. You might be wrong about who your parents are or where you were born, or even who you married, too. Dr. H recently brought up the distinction between "verification" and "proof." I suggest you study these two concepts.
And about the tone -- if you post here, please do grow up, already.
No, Mr. Marshall, if any sane person sees a dead man raised or someone waling on water, the first response is to objectively investigate what he has believed he has seen.
People have been declared dead in hospital emergency rooms only to be found to be breathing at a later time, even in a morgue. It wasn't that they came back to life, it was only that humans, even doctors, can make mistakes.
And I've seen illusionist Chris Angel walk on water. And bring a dead fly back to life.
By your logic, both of these acts are MIRACULOUS!!!!!!
"Paul does, in fact, tell his conversion story three times in Acts'
Oh, come now, Mr. Marshall! You surely are not so ignorant or obtuse to believe that Paul wrote anything in Acts. The descriptions of Paul's conversion in Acts may be true. But it's only speculation.
And Paul never describes what a "revealed" Jesus looks like, does he?
And, contrary to what you write, Paul never mentions "meeting" Jesus at all.
He does refer to "seeing" Jesus, which may very well be some sort of Damascus road type of experience. But he doesn't describe it like that at all.
And your blathering about Paul making two trips to Damascus has nothing to do with any point that I was trying to make. Paul never states where he was when he "converted" to being a believer in Jesus, nor does he himself give any specific details of that experience.
And does "growing up" include believing that two thousand years ago in the Middle East desert some supernatural being climbed up inside some little girls vagina in order to be born as a man?
I'll wait with bated breath for you to grow up, Dave.
TOF: You said Paul "never mentions" the "Damascus Road conversion experience." As indicated above, this is dubious for two reason: (1) He is quoted as telling the story twice in Acts; how do you know Luke is misquoting him? Having studied two of Paul's speeches in Acts, and comparing them to what he writes in Romans, I am convinced Luke knew and represented his man well, as is Ben Witherington, a leading scholar of Acts. (2) Paul leaves out the detail about the Damascus road when he mentions his conversion story in his letters, twice, but he does mention his conversion story twice. And once he implies that it took place on the way to Damascus. So you are being a little disingenuous.
I didn't "blather" about Paul making two trips to Damascus: I pointed out that he SAYS he made those two trips.
Yes, doctors, and people at a magic show, can be fooled. So can scientists, and people reading skeptical web sites. Who said reality has to be simple and easy to figure out? And what does that have to do with any of the points in this blog?
Your last snide little remark goes beyond stupid insults to myself, into the arena of gratutitous blasphemy. It's unfortunate that so many Internet atheists, most of whom lack the guts to give their real names, choose to take such a tone. If your next post does not show more grasp of ordinary, civilized courtesies, it will not appear here.
"You may think they have in fact never been verified ... How do you know no one has ever heard from God verbally, or seen the dead rise, for instance?"
Once again we arrive at the crux of the communications difficulty I pointed out in my recent comment to one of your other posts. Most people have a default definition of "verified" which they will fall back on, goven no additional specific information to the contrary. And for most people that definition involves a communal element: an assertion or claim is not "verified" unless it is possible for someone else to independently test the claim and obtain the same results under controlled conditions, and until someone else has done so.
What you are proposing is a non-standard definition of "verifiable" which amounts to special pleading in the case of religious claims. I can use your exact formulation to ask: How do you know no one has ever seen a pig fly, or turned a lead fishing sinker into gold on their kitchen stove?
You're still not going to find very many people who accept either transmutation or aeronautical suidae.
"Miracles are, precisely, verification of religious claims."
Neat bit of circular argument there: One unverifiable thing is verification of another unverifiable thing. A "miracle" is a religious claim.
"My point is that Avalos cannot reasonably conflate scientific verification with verification in general, either."
Of course he can, so long as he defines the term in that way from the onset. Elsewhere you went on at some length arguing that words can be defined any way we want, and now you're saying that that they can't. You can't have it both ways. And the default defintion of "verify" is closer to the scientific meaning of the term than to the meaning you're trying to give it -- it means "to establish the truth, accuracy, or reality of [ ]"
"I don't know why you're surprised what I said about communism."
What surprises me is that you admit that you can only claim communism as a "religion" by utilizing an unusually broad definition of "religion".
"I've made the same point to you many times -- that scholars of communism often describe it as a secular or atheistic religion."
Mostly only those scholars who you happen to like, apparently. Most of the scholars I've read -- including Marx and Engels themselves -- describe it as a socio-economic system.
"I said miracles ARE verification, not that they need to be verified."
Of course miracles need to be verified. A miracle is a claim that something happened apparetly contrary to natural law.
As your 'earthier' commentator TruthOverfaith points out, upon apparently witnessing something contrary to nature, the first rational thing to do would be to try to verify that what one thinks one witnessed was what actually occured. Until and unless a purported "miracle" can be verified, it really can't furnish verification for something else.
Unless you're content with such reasoning as using fairies as verification that unicorns exist.
Dr. H: You begin with dubious semantics. "Verify" is not, in fact, limitted to scientific testing, thus the COMMON expression, "Please call to verify."
How do I know no one has ever seen a pig fly? I don't, of course, and neither do you. There may, in fact, be planets where pigs commonly fly. It may have happened here, too.
Transmutations of metals and miracles are intrinsically different. The first is supposed to be done my physical means. The second involves the intervention of God. We know lead doesn't change into gold in normal chemical reactions; you'd need some sort of very high-energy fission reaction to turn the trick. But given a multiverse, the mathematical odds are that sometime, some place, a lead lure MAY have changed into a golden one. And it's also possible that someone, somewhere, has found another shortcut. But there's a difference between scientific and miraculous means, and finding reasons against the first, does not undermine reports of the second.
"A miracle IS a religious claim."
In the same sense that reports that the NY Yankees won a baseball game IS a report favorable to Yankee fans, and also evidence that their team really is good.
No, Avalos cannot assume that his readers must allow only scientific verification, when he has not so specified. Were he to do this, everything else he says would be self-evidently ridiculous -- since this whole book offers not one shred of purely "scientific" evidence for any of its claims. Just a lot of "he said, she said, they're probably right, and that verifies my point for me." It's called "history."
Do I need to keep a list of scholars of communism who make this same remark? I run into a new one every few days -- those I agree with, those I disagree with. I once cited a bunch of them for you. Guess you didn't like any of them, eh?
"Verify" is not, in fact, limitted to scientific testing,
Funny, I thought that was exactly what I pointed out: "...for most people that definition involves a communal element" as your new example "Please call to verify" implies. Surely someone 'calling to verify' is not calling themselves; they are calling some other person.
How do I know no one has ever seen a pig fly? ... It may have happened here, too.
The essence of your claim is "anything is possible". This is, of course, ridiculous. Were it true, there could be no natural law; and nothing could be predicted with hope of anything beyond random chance accuracy.
This is the way pre-scientific research ambled along, at a arthritic snail's-pace, for several thousand years, until the scientific method was codified during the enlightenment and scientific progress began an exponential increase.
"Transmutations of metals and miracles are intrinsically different. The first is supposed to be done my physical means."
They are intrinsically the same because both involve violation of natural law.
And if you think alchemy was only physical, you need to take a closer look at the history of alchemy. Manipulation of physical "stuff" was only half the process. No alchemist worth his base metal was without his book of incantations.
"But given a multiverse, the mathematical odds are that sometime, some place, a lead lure MAY have changed into a golden one."
Wow, talk about making "assumptions!"
We haven't been "given a multiverse." "Multiverse" is a borderline sci-fi idea on the fringes of speculative physics, not an established fact. Moreover, even those who favor a multiverse are forced to admit that such a concept can never be verified.
For better or worse, we're stuck with a mere 'universe', and it's not even agreed whether that is infinite in extent or not.
If it is not, then no, not anything you can imagine will happen somewhere. Some things will never happen. Some things can never happen.
At any rate, all of this side-steps the real issue of verification. If you claim something happened, the burden of proof falls on you to demonstrate that it did, indeed, happen. So if tell me you saw a pig fly, my next statement is going to be,
"Cool! Show me."
Dr H: "A miracle IS a religious claim."
DM: In the same sense that reports that the NY Yankees won a baseball game IS a report favorable to Yankee fans, and also evidence that their team really is good.
Not the same thing at all; not even close.
You said, "Miracles are, precisely, verification of religious claims," and you've just admitted that miracles themselves are religious claims when you stated "miracles ... [involve] the intervention of God."
We have mondo independently verifiable physical evidence for the existence of the Yankees, so the fact that the Yankees have won a game is "verification" of their existence in only the most trivial sense. They might well never win another game, ever, but they would still be the Yankees.
A better analogy would be fairydust is verification of fairies."
Fine, but until can show me that you have independently verified the existence of either fairies or fairydust, you have merely presented a meaningless circular argument, and not verified anything.
Avalos cannot assume that his readers must allow only scientific verification,
I didn't say that he could. What I said was that the default understanding of "verification" is a lot closer the scientific definition than it is to your definition.
"Guess you didn't like any of them, eh?"
How about all of the scholars of communism who have never said that is is a "religion," nor treated it as such? Are we keeping score here?
Someone can say "I am a Christian," but they're not necesarily a Christian -- yet someone else says "communism is a religion" and communism magically becomes a
religion?
OK, lets run with that:
Pigs fly. Lead turns to gold on your kitchen stove (but only when you're alone!).
Church hierarchy's aren't political. Trees are balloons; cars are tuna fish; Mormons are rubber ducks. War is peace; freedom is slavery; ignorance is strength.
Hmm... well, we see where that goes, eh?
Let's get back to Avalos' book. Here's how HE uses the concept of verification:
"Hezekiah was faced with a threat from the rapacious Assyrian empire centered in Mesopotamia. The Assyrians had come all the way to Jerusalem in an attempt to take the city by force. This attempt is documented by Assyrian sources." (129)
So Avalos begins with one source -- II Kings 18 -- and verifies it by means of an independent source -- Assyrian documents.
No science involved, no absolute proof, but not bad as history goes.
Can Avalos really claim Christian arguments for, say, the Resurrection of Jesus, never depend on similiar argumentation? Can you?
Or how about the claim in Genesis, for instance, that all humanity is "one blood," contradicting ancient and modern claims that people belong to different species.
Is it unreasonable to say this claim has been scientifically supported by the discovery of the close genetic unity among all races of human beings?
It is a simple fact that Christians often argue that way.
So whatever you mean by "verify," it is plainly wrong to say Christianity claims no empirical verification.
"The essence of your claim is "anything is possible". This is, of course, ridiculous. Were it true, there could be no natural law; and nothing could be predicted with hope of anything beyond random chance accuracy."
Heh. Beware of distilling essences of ideas; the distillation process never seems very pure.
That is NOT the essence of my claim. But the essence of many atheist claims about the universe, is that given an infinite number of unscene universes, one was bound to supersede the more than astronomical odds against our anthropically friendly universe.
So don't come to me talking about scientific method.
"They are intrinsically the same because both involve violation of natural law."
That's anachronistic. From the alchemists' POV, he is relying on natural laws. From teh Christian's POV, he is relying on the God who created natural laws. Two different things.
"No alchemist worth his base metal was without his book of incantations."
Maybe so; a bit of a hodge-podge.
"We haven't been "given a multiverse." "Multiverse" is a borderline sci-fi idea on the fringes of speculative physics, not an established fact."
Thank you. A lot of your fellow atheists seem to see it as the latter -- including famous scientists, it seems.
"At any rate, all of this side-steps the real issue of verification."
Which I return to, at the beginning of this post, giving an example of how Avalos actually uses the concept.
Can Avalos really claim Christian arguments for, say, the Resurrection of Jesus, never depend on similiar argumentation? Can you?
Interesting that you ask this question right after giving an example of one sort of historical verification.
The historical claim is that a number of 1st century people from the area in and around Jerusalem believed that a person named "Jesus" rose from the dead at a particluar place and time. That historical claim seems to be verified by certain anecdotal historical evidence. ("Seems to be," because there are no surviving first-hand accounts, and there is also ample historical evidence to the effect that the anecdotes have been considerably embellished multiple times.)
What is not supported by evidence is that the "Jesus" in question -- or anyone, for that matter-- actually did rise from the dead. That is a physical claim, and as such requires physical evidence for verification. There is a huge body of physical evidence to the effect that people do not rise from the dead. A claim to the contrary, then, is a most extraordinary claim, and certainly requires more than (ambiguous) anecdotal support for verification.
But the essence of many atheist claims about the universe, is that given an infinite number of unscene universes, one was bound to supersede the more than astronomical odds against our anthropically friendly universe.
I guess I'm not familiar with those particular atheist claims.
You seem to be afflicted with a common misunderstanding of probability. If something has a 1-in-a-billion probability of happening, that does not mean that all of the other 999,999,999 possibilities must occur before that one rare event can happen. It simply means that based on past observation of similar events and/or related factors the event in question is not very likely to occur very often.
But if that event does occur, that was it: the "1" time that was predicted. It is not likely to occur again before most of the other 999,999,999 possibilities happen -- but it could. (See my example of the two "500 year" floods which occured within 5 years of each other.) So you don't need to have 999,999,999 actual events (or universes) available for occurance of an event that is possible, no matter how improbable.
Bear in mind that a probability is simply a "best guess" estimate based on available data. Should additional data become available, it could well alter the calculation of the probability.
Dr. H: Why not try understanding my point, before slipping into your patronizing default, "Only we engineers have the slighest concept of anything mathematical" mode?
The point here is, if there is an infinite number of universes, as many atheists aver, any event that is at all possible, however unlikely, is bound to occur an INFINITE number of times.
Including pigs that evolve to fly.
Including lead lures that spontaneously lose a few protons and neutrons, and "degrade" into gold.
Including all kinds of other "miracles."
But this is not the same as saying "Everything is possible," still less, "everything is likely on this planet, in historical times."
From the alchemists' POV, he is relying on natural laws. From teh Christian's POV, he is relying on the God who created natural laws. Two different things.
Nope: exactly the same thing. The alchemist believes that magic (ie., the supernatural) can influence events in the natural world. The Christian believes that God (ie., the supernatural) can influence events in the natural world.
A lot of your fellow atheists seem to see it as the latter -- including famous scientists, it seems.
Assumption of multiverses resolves some mathematical issues as regards certain incongruities between relativity theory and quantum theory, so some physicists find it an attractive concept. Problem is, there are other mathematical models that also do this, so at present we can't even claim that the multiverse concept has been mathematically verified, much less physically.
I view it as one of several "Linus's blankets" that modern physicists tend to clutch at for security in times of mathematical distress.
So if, based on reflection and prayer, and appealing to deep theological beliefs, Dietrich Bonhoeffer decides to join the conspiracy to kill Adolf Hitler, his fellow-conspirators may be innocent, because of their secular motives, but Bonhoeffer alone must stand guilty?
I'd say it depends on whether he's killing Hitler "for God," or for the betterment of mankind.
Admittedly basing guilt on internal
motivation is always a little tricky, though.
Why not try understanding my point, before slipping into your patronizing default, "Only we engineers have the slighest concept of anything mathematical" mode?
I didn't say that, nor was I implying it. Most statisticians understand probability quite adequately, and statasticians aren't even close to being engineers. :)
But you do show signs of what is a very common misconception about probability. When an event of low probability occurs, a lot of peole react as if it were a miraculous occurance, simply because they aren't clear on the point that "very unlikely" does not mean "impossible."
The point here is, if there is an infinite number of universes, as many atheists aver, any event that is at all possible, however unlikely, is bound to occur an INFINITE number of times.
I understood your point. My point is that it's not germane to the argument. Something unlikely but possible doesn't have to occur an infinite number of times -- in or out of our universe -- to occur in our faces. It only has to happen once.
BTW, if there are an infinite number of universes, such that even very unlikely events occur an infinite number of times over the collection, then "probability" becomes meaningless: the probability of any given thing occuring reduces to 1 -- a certainty.
That's what happens when you take additional data into account.
Including pigs that evolve to fly.
Assuming that's a possibility. It isn't, under constraints of the natural laws we know.
Including lead lures that spontaneously lose a few protons and neutrons, and "degrade" into gold.
Likewise.
A one ounce lure of lead "spontaneously" losing the three protons and neutrons per atom required to turn it into gold would release fission energy roughly equivalent to 4 million times the entire world's annual production of electricity.
Among other things about that which might spoil your day would be trying to collect and reconstitute the gold atoms converted to plasma by the sudden energy release.
But this is not the same as saying "Everything is possible," still less, "everything is likely on this planet, in historical times.
Really it is, but we don't even require these speculative gymnastics to dismiss your claim.
It reduces to an argumentum ad ignorantiam. Eg., just because neither you nor I can know to a mathematical certainty that no one has ever witnessed a pig flying, it does not follow that therefore there must be winged pigs.
@Dr H:
"This is the way pre-scientific research ambled along, at a arthritic snail's-pace, for several thousand years, until the scientific method was codified during the enlightenment and scientific progress began an exponential increase."
Historical ignorance at its best.
"Assumption of multiverses resolves some mathematical issues as regards certain incongruities between relativity theory and quantum theory, so some physicists find it an attractive concept."
False. The incompatibility between QM and GR is an isse orthogonal to the multiverse hypothesis.
"Problem is, there are other mathematical models that also do this, so at present we can't even claim that the multiverse concept has been mathematically verified, much less physically."
What is "mathematical verification"?
And if there is a problem in physics it surely is not "mathematical distress".
"BTW, if there are an infinite number of universes, such that even very unlikely events occur an infinite number of times over the collection, then "probability" becomes meaningless: the probability of any given thing occuring reduces to 1 -- a certainty."
False. It is certainly possible to concoct multiverses with an infinite number of universes in which an event (say the birth of a specific universe) can happen an infinite number of times and with *any* probability whatsoever, 0 included.
That is what happens when you actually know a little about measure theory.
Some clarifications if you please:
"And for most people that definition involves a communal element: an assertion or claim is not "verified" unless it is possible for someone else to independently test the claim and obtain the same results under controlled conditions, and until someone else has done so."
I will assume that by "verification" you mean conducting some sort of experiment, possibly in a controlled setting, to test some claim. If this is not what you mean, then please, correct me. This verification standard you have in mind applies to what fields of human knowledge? All human knowledge? If not all human knowledge, why not? The reason I am asking this is because in one post you say
"What is not supported by evidence is that the "Jesus" in question -- or anyone, for that matter-- actually did rise from the dead. That is a physical claim, and as such requires physical evidence for verification. There is a huge body of physical evidence to the effect that people do not rise from the dead. A claim to the contrary, then, is a most extraordinary claim, and certainly requires more than (ambiguous) anecdotal support for verification."
The resurrection of Jesus Christ is an *historical claim*, do not confuse things. You are simply begging the question since you assume from the beginning that since there is no God there can be no resurrections, but *if* we had independent reasons to believe that God exists, your request is simply misplaced. And thus my questions above.
In another of your posts you say and I quote:
"They are intrinsically the same because both involve violation of natural law."
What is a "natural law"? If you speak of human laws imposed by a governing body, I know immediately what you mean, but when talking of "natural law" I am a bit at a loss, especially if one drags along such talk as "violation of natural law", which makes a univocal comparison of "natural law" with "human law" which is somewhat confusing, thus my question.
"Historical ignorance at its best."
Indeed?
http://nobeliefs.com/images/DarkAges.gif
"The incompatibility between QM and GR is an isse orthogonal to the multiverse hypothesis."
Not central, perhaps, but certainly not "orthogonal". The Everett interpretation of QM provides for the existence of other "worlds" (universes) in which the physical laws may preclude the gravitational paradoxes.
"It is certainly possible to concoct multiverses with an infinite number of universes in which an event (say the birth of a specific universe) can happen an infinite number of times and with *any* probability whatsoever, 0 included."
Indeed it is, but that doesn't render my statement false, since such a concoction was not what I addressed.
"I will assume that by "verification" you mean conducting some sort of experiment, possibly in a controlled setting, to test some claim."
No.
In essence, David is criticizing Avalos for employing a non-standard usage of "verification" which he (Avalos) does not specifically define, and uses this a a springboard to a critique of Avalos's larger thesis. However, David himself assumes a non-standard usage for "verification" which he asserts the average reader would default to, lacking specificity from Avalos.
My contention is that this is a straw man argument on David's part, because David's definition is not the average person's default understanding of the term. They are going to default to some curent colloquial definition, most of which involve some element of agreement between or among more than one person, as to there existing compelling evidence to support the claim for which verification is sought. That definition is closer to the scientific definition of "experiment, testing..." and so on, than it is to David's definition.
"The resurrection of Jesus Christ is an *historical claim*, do not confuse things."
Actually, it is you who have confused things. The claim that Jesus was resurrected is indeed an historical claim. But within that historical claim is an implicit physical claim: that the resurrection of the dead is possible at all.
"You are simply begging the question since you assume from the beginning that since there is no God there can be no resurrections,"
Not at all. I dismiss the concept of ressurection based on the compilation of existing physical evidence to date, none of which supports the claim that such a thing is possible. God doesn't enter into this chain of reasoning at all, nor does He need to.
"What is a "natural law"?"
Thank yo for pointing out the imprecision of this term; probably I should avoid it. I had in mind the concept of scientific law: a theory confirmed by repeated observation over a long period of time. Of course any truly scientific theory, being falsifiable, is subject to obsolescence and replacement should a significant amount of new data be discovered which comes into conflict with the predictions of said theory.
To put this into current context, in order for "miracles" (e.g., resurrections) to not be in violation of "natural law", we would have to have a significant body of objectively confirmed miracles with which to challenge the particular "law" one contemplates overturning.
There are, of course, ample examples of human law being derrived from what people believed to be natural law at the time. But this isn't really germane to the current discussion.
@Dr H:
"Historical ignorance at its best.
Indeed?
http://nobeliefs.com/images/DarkAges.gif"
Indeed, rank historical ignorance. Start with:
http://m-francis.livejournal.com/101929.html
http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2009/12/return-of-age-of-unreason-part-i.html
http://tofspot.blogspot.com/2009/12/return-of-age-of-unreason-part-ii.html
These are blog posts by a single author, but there are whole books by actual, real, bona-fide historians devoted to the subject like Edward Grant, Regine Pernoud, David Lindberg, Lynn White, etc.
"Not central, perhaps, but certainly not "orthogonal". The Everett interpretation of QM provides for the existence of other "worlds" (universes) in which the physical laws may preclude the gravitational paradoxes."
The other worlds of Everett's interpretation have nothing to do with the other universes in the multiverse. You are conflating two different issues. And I do not know what you mean by "gravitational paradoxes".
"In essence, David is criticizing Avalos for employing a non-standard usage of "verification" which he (Avalos) does not specifically define, and uses this a a springboard to a critique of Avalos's larger thesis. However, David himself assumes a non-standard usage for "verification" which he asserts the average reader would default to, lacking specificity from Avalos."
And I was not addressing Prof. Avalos' thesis because I have not read his book; what I was asking you was a clarification. What do you mean by "verification", especially in light of such patent absurdities as, to quote from your earlier post, "mathematical verification". Do you have positivist leanings? And if yes, then the other questions in my previous post: does such a verification principle apply to all fields of human knowledge? etc. and etc.
"The resurrection of Jesus Christ is an *historical claim*, do not confuse things.
Actually, it is you who have confused things. The claim that Jesus was resurrected is indeed an historical claim. But within that historical claim is an implicit physical claim: that the resurrection of the dead is possible at all."
Actually it is you who are confusing things. That there is an implicit physical claim is a trite observation; the resurrection, if it happened, was a singular event, like the Big Bang say, but unlike the latter, there is no equivalent to the tell traces of the background radiation or the star red shift for the hard empirical sciences like physics to look out for. The only method of "verification" is the historical one -- more on this in my post below.
@Dr H:
"You are simply begging the question since you assume from the beginning that since there is no God there can be no resurrections,
Not at all. I dismiss the concept of ressurection based on the compilation of existing physical evidence to date, none of which supports the claim that such a thing is possible. God doesn't enter into this chain of reasoning at all, nor does He need to."
You dismiss the resurrection because it is a miracle. That it is a miracle, if it happened, we can both agree (it would hardly be evidence for Christianity otherwise) but your inductive reasoning only has force if we can a priori exclude non-physical agencies, in other words the argument runs like this: since the resurrection is physically impossible, and the only things that are possible are the physically possible things, the resurrection did not happen. But if we have independent grounds to accept that God exists then God could perfectly perform such a feat -- which I repeat, is a singular event -- and thus your inductive argument is just irrelevant.
"What is a "natural law"?
Thank yo for pointing out the imprecision of this term; probably I should avoid it. I had in mind the concept of scientific law: a theory confirmed by repeated observation over a long period of time. Of course any truly scientific theory, being falsifiable, is subject to obsolescence and replacement should a significant amount of new data be discovered which comes into conflict with the predictions of said theory."
That was not the thrust of my question -- my bad. Although it is interesting that in the same breath you affirm that no scientific theory is definitive and yet you make some very definitive and categorical pronouncements based on it. Anyway, to get back on track, I am not asking you what is a scientific law; a physicist can perfectly content himself with an operational definition (something like an abstract mathematical description that correctly predicts the observed correlations) but since you are deriving *philosophical* consequences from such "law" talk, I would like to know what you understand by natural law. Is there actually such a thing as a "natural law", maybe living in some Platonic la-la land? If there are no "laws", but mere observed regularities then it does not even make sense to say that this or that hypothetical event "violates natural law". How do you account for the order in the universe? Whence the order? I repeat, these are philosophical questions; if you are not interested in answering them, that is fine, but then you should not draw philosophical inferences from what you imagine Science (suitably hypostatized) is telling us like, and I quote:
"To put this into current context, in order for "miracles" (e.g., resurrections) to not be in violation of "natural law", we would have to have a significant body of objectively confirmed miracles with which to challenge the particular "law" one contemplates overturning."
Post a Comment