I just completed my PhD, and am looking for work. I saw this job description from a school in Georgia, for someone to teach world religions:
"Religious Studies at Georgia X explores questions in a non-sectarian setting, in which the "truth value" of any religious outlook is not at issue. We do not ask whether a religion is right or wrong, but how and why a religion is meaningful to the people who practice it. Our goal is not to enhance our own personal faiths, although this may be a welcome benefit to some, but to explore faith and belief from the perspective of the liberal arts."
Questions:
(1) How can one "explore faith and belief" without talking about the objects of faith and belief?
(2) If "truth value" is not an issue, does that mean the professor should never raise it? Should have no opinion on it? Or should hold a particular opinion on it of which the administration approves -- say, that all religions are equally true, or equally false?
(3) How can an ultimate view of reality be "meaningful" if it is not at all true? Isn't meaning related to truth? If I say, "It is sunny today," that is a meaningful statement, even if it is snowing -- a meaningful but false statement. But surely the statement is not very meaningful if we dismiss the notion of truth from the get-go. And surely what one derives from a meaningful but false statement, is trouble in the real world -- one goes to the beach in a bathing suit, and gets frostbite in a blizzard.
(4) Does a Christian, or anyone but a relativist and secular humanist, have a chance in Hades of getting this job?
(5) Do Christians pay taxes to sponsor higher education in the state of Georgia?
Update: I asked these questions on a site where serious Christians post, and got a lot of reactions like that of Crude, below. This made me think one of two things may be going on: (1) Either I was irritable this morning, and over-reacted (very possible), or (2) I didn't explain what troubles me about this advertisement very well. Just in case it's the latter, let's rework this into an advertisement for a physics prof:
"The Physics Department at Georgia X explores scientific questions in a non-sectarian setting, in which the 'truth value' of any interpretation of quantum physics is not at issue. We do not ask whether a given stance on indeterminacy is right or wrong, but how and why that stance is meaningful to the scientists who practice it. Our goal is not to enhance our own personal theories, although this may be a welcome benefit to some, but to explore faith and belief from the perspective of Calvinistic theology."
Sorry, but in religion, as in science, "truth value" is always at issue. If one is being taught, even just by example, not to ask whether a given stance is true or false, one is by default being taught some particular stance -- agnosticism, perhaps, or more likely, that "all religions are equally false," because we know before asking that the Enlightenment is true. This is similiar to the de facto (and probably intended) result of "methodological naturalism:" by setting miracles outside of the realm of possibility for the sake of doing science, the intent seems to be that students will learn to set miracles outside of the realm of possibility for ALL purposes. And that's often how it works in practice. Borders laid in clay, harden into cement.
I find it patronizing to assume either that a teacher cannot teach fairly if she frankly admits her biases (most of my best teachers did just that), or that students will wilt and class turn into Sunday School if they do so. None of my best religion or philosophy profs was a Christian: one was an atheist and secular humanist, another an atheist and practicing communist revolutionary who brought black arm bands to school to protest the death of a student in Nicaragua. The worst was probably a New Ager or Buddhist of some sort, but he was too timid (and therefore boring) to express his own opinions in class.
Please don't mistake me. I'm not saying a teacher should be obnoxious, or cram his worldview down his students' throats. I taught in four colleges and universities in the heavily secular country of Japan. None of my supervisors was a Christian. I expressed my Christian faith when appropriate (say, at Christmas), but also tried to act like a professional, which my supervisors seemed to recognize, for example on the letter of recommendation my primary supervisor gave. I can't even imagine teaching world religions, say (to give it credit, Islam), while trying to divorce "meaning" from the insistant Muslim claim to be true, or pretending that my mind is empty of opinions on the subject. Students deserve more credit and honesty than that, IMHO.
5 comments:
As much as I normally have a low opinion of schools, I think on this one it's not nearly as problematic (going by the statement alone) as I think you're suggesting.
I don't think the statement is saying that the 'objects of faith and belief' won't be discussed. I take them to mean they're going to focus on what is, in fact, believed, and put aside the question of whether or not it's reasonable to believe such.
If my goal is to describe what person X believes, I can get quite a lot done while completely putting aside whether or not what person X believes is true. (Not entirely put it aside, but I can get a lot done.)
Does a Christian, or anyone but a relativist and secular humanist, have a chance in Hades of getting this job?
Based on the statement itself, I think a Christian easily could. In practice? There's probably a lot more going on with such a decision, and a concern there is probably valid.
A relativist or a secular humanist ideally wouldn't be teaching the course and saying things like 'Well, Christians believe this - which is crazy and false', since that too would go against the hiring statement.
How can an ultimate view of reality be "meaningful" if it is not at all true? Isn't meaning related to truth?
I suppose one reply would be, meaning in this case would be related to what's thought to be true, not truth itself. So for person X believing in claim A, the idea that A is true is important - but from the perspective of the teacher, whether or not A is in fact true may not be important for their purposes.
Hopefully I'm making some sense hree.
Crude: I've gotten other feedback along the same lines in another forum, which makes me think either I was too irritable this morning (very possible), or didn't explain myself well enough.
On the chance that it's the latter, I may add some further considerations later in the day, after I get a little work done . . .
What gets me is that "truth value" is in scare quotes. The whole thing would have been different if it hadn't been for the implication there that truth value isn't real for religions. They say they don't ask whether a religion is right or wrong, but it's not because they want to avoid judging a religion wrong (or right), it's because they don't think the question even applies.
Maybe I'm reading too much into it, but either someone doesn't know what quotation marks are for, or else those scare quotes are there for a reason.
Crude, Tom: I've tried to explain my objections more clearly by doubling the length of the OP, above. Of course, I may still be wrong.
The Physics Department at Georgia X explores scientific questions in a non-sectarian setting, in which the 'truth value' of any interpretation of quantum physics is not at issue.
I think you may have picked a bad example to make your case, since the ontological status of quantum physics interpretations and even how to interpret indeterminacy is (to my knowledge) something physicists expressly avoid most of the time. So oddly enough - at least, if my understanding of the field is correct - your statement would actually fly in that department.
That aside, I think I get your point. Points, actually. Let's see if I get what you're saying.
First, there's an insidious aspect to teaching world religions in a purely detached, hands-off manner - it keeps you from taking the religion seriously. Instead of presenting religious claims as something to determine as true or false, you just... learn and admire their aesthetics, in a way, and may never get the urge to go beyond that. "Studying religion doesn't involve judging it to be true or false." ultimately leads to "Religious claims don't actually matter."
If that's what you're saying, then I get you and agree. I think my only objection would be that I see value in the 'learning what is believed, without judging it' aspect of things - even if I see the danger I think you're outlining. And really, I hear so many horror stories about university religion classes (and went through an annoying one myself) that I think the prospect of demanding professors get more involved on the truth aspect of things sounds to my ears like 'Turn religious studies into an even more explicit "let's turn these kids into atheists by abusing our authority as professors" practice', even if unintentionally.
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